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CHAPTER 10 
 
MIRACLE SHMIRACLE: DAVID HUME VERSUS 
THE EARLY JEWISH RABBIS 
 
MARK HARRIS 
 
 
 
The title of this chapter is inspired by an old Jewish joke.
1
 A certain 
doctor is famed for his miraculous ability to cure arthritis. One day, his 
waiting room full, a little old lady, bent double over her walking stick, 
shuffles in slowly, waits her turn, and goes in to see the good doctor. Half 
an hour later she emerges, standing up straight, her head held high. The next 
person declares: “It’s a miracle, you walked in bent over, and now you’re 
standing tall. What did he do to you?” “Miracle, shmiracle,” says the old 
lady, “he gave me a longer stick.”  
This joke encapsulates the somewhat tongue-in-cheek view of miracles 
that we find in some ancient Jewish sources such as the Babylonian 
Talmud. More than a thousand years before early modern science was 
revolutionising the laws of nature, leading to an inevitable worry about how 
these laws are compatible with belief in miracles, the Jewish rabbis of the 
early centuries of the Common Era (CE) were pondering the relationship 
between miracle and the laws of nature. In this chapter, I will discuss some 
ways in which this ancient form of Jewish wisdom relates to modern 
thinking on miracle, and especially to the definitive modernist perspective 
of David Hume. I will suggest that rabbinic thinking on miracle (which 
includes a significant degree of scepticism) can offer a helpful positive 
alternative to Hume’s much better-known scepticism.  
We turn to describe Hume’s treatment of miracle first of all, and 
especially its relationship with laws of nature. Despite the importance of his 
empiricism overall, Hume’s treatment of miracle is often thought to be 
rather lacking in rigour. Keith Ward, for instance, declares that Hume’s 
arguments against miracles are “exceptionally poor…and they can be 
quickly disposed of” (Ward 2002, 742, 745). It is therefore interesting to 
                                                        
1 http://jewishumor.blogspot.co.uk/2009/07/miracle-shmiracle.html. Accessed on 3rd 
December 2013. 
note that, in spite of such criticisms, Hume’s definition of miracle is 
virtually ubiquitous, perhaps because it serves the equally ubiquitous 
modern meme that science and religion are totally opposed.  
Hume’s famous definition of miracle appears in Chapter X (‘On 
Miracles’) of his An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748), and 
its most succinct statement in an Endnote: “A miracle may be accurately 
defined, a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the 
Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent” (‘On Miracles’, X.12, 
Endnote). Note the juridical language here. A “transgression” is of course a 
wrongdoing, and Hume also uses the word “violation” (‘On Miracles’, 
X.12), both terms communicating the sense that a miracle involves a rigid 
framework being abused. This negativity gives rise to the first criticism that 
is often made of Hume’s view, that it sets up a stratospherically-high view 
of the laws of nature, whereby they cannot be bypassed, adjusted, or 
overlooked, but can only be violently abused. The second criticism 
highlights the lack of coherence in Hume’s use of the juridical metaphor of 
“law of nature”. For in Hume’s statement above, a miracle can only occur 
when the Deity (or an invisible agent, i.e. something beyond experience, 
and which is therefore supernatural) transgresses the laws. This means that 
the lawmaker and lawenforcer must also be the lawbreaker. Not only does 
this provide an incoherent picture of God, it also stretches the juridical 
metaphor of law of nature to its breaking point.  
For that is exactly what Hume’s definition makes use of: a very old 
metaphor, and far older than Hume himself. There has been some 
disagreement in historical studies of early modern science over how the 
transformation of the term “law of nature” came to pass, from the juridical 
and theological metaphor of antiquity (which linked the regularities of 
nature with the divine lawgiver), to the non-theological terminology of 
modern science (where the regularities, “laws”, refer to causal, natural 
mechanisms; Henry 2004). However, it seems clear that in Hume’s above 
definition of miracle he is harking back to the 
juridical/theological/metaphorical use of “law of nature”, an idea that has an 
important biblical heritage, especially in the Hebrew Bible (Zilsel 1942, 
247-8; Jaeger 2008), and which was familiar to Greek thinkers of antiquity 
such as the Stoics, as well as Patristic authors such as Basil and Augustine 
(Padgett 2003).  
Moreover, Hume was not the first of the early modern thinkers to use 
the juridical/theological metaphor of a law being broken to define miracle–
–Robert Boyle, for instance, preceded him (Harrison 1995, 535)––but 
Hume’s account is certainly the best known, perhaps on account of his 
withering scepticism, which more or less puts miracles out of court. And it 
is this scepticism which provides the substance for Hume’s next step in his 
discussion of ‘On Miracles’, as he proceeds to enthrone the laws of nature 
(and his empirical knowledge of them), on a nearly-unassailable pedestal. 
“A firm and unalterable experience has established these laws”, he says, 
such as that “all men must die; that lead cannot, of itself, remain suspended 
in the air; that fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water” (‘On 
Miracles’, X.12).  
How “firm and unalterable” are these particular laws that Hume cites? 
Such is the onward march of science that we might question Hume at this 
point, or at least these examples, which appear less “firm” than Hume 
supposed. Lead can of itself remain suspended in the air (in a magnetic 
field, as a result of the Meissner effect, with a critical temperature for lead 
of 7.2 K). Moreover, there are types of fire which burn under water. As far 
as we know though, Hume was right when he said that “all men must die” 
(but it is worth noting that the mere existence of contemporary fields of 
interest such as artificial intelligence, transhumanism, and cryonics suggest 
that, whether they are realistic or not, technological solutions to human 
mortality are already under investigation). Therefore, an important lesson 
may be learned from Hume’s premature rhetoric concerning these 
examples: science is in a state of constant flux; it is unwise to be too 
prescriptive about the laws of nature, since yesterday’s miracle may be 
tomorrow’s scientific law.  
A further important question arises. Philosophers of science have, over 
the centuries since Hume, repeatedly asked whether the laws of nature are 
prescriptive or descriptive of nature, but no clear consensus has emerged. 
Answers have ranged from necessitarian accounts at one end of the 
spectrum, to instrumentalist accounts at the other, with intermediate 
positions also being advocated (such as the idea that the laws are basically 
statistical). Likewise, the related question of whether nature is deterministic 
or not has been met with no clear answer. While developments in twentieth 
century physics such as quantum mechanics and chaos theory have been 
held up as examples of ontological indeterminacy in nature, these same 
developments also submit to interpretations where the indeterminacy is 
epistemological rather than ontological. And science, while undoubtedly 
successful at describing potential laws of nature in empirical terms, lacks 
the competency to pronounce on their underlying basis. For this reason, 
scientific hypotheses made on the basis of one particular philosophical 
interpretation of the laws should be viewed with caution, since they stray 
into the territory of metaphysics. Such an example (although not without 
merit) is provided by the claims of many modern cosmologists, that these 
laws are so omnipotent and universal that they describe not just our 
universe, but a whole ensemble of untestable universes (the multiverse). Of 
course, one of the reasons the multiverse hypothesis is invoked is to provide 
a non-theistic answer to the question of fine-tuning. In which case, a degree 
of Humean irony arises: although our understanding of the laws of nature––
those that make the multiverse hypothesis meaningful and cogent––has 
expanded in scientific and mathematical terms far beyond what Hume might 
ever have dreamed of when he constructed his account of miracle, yet we 
have come full circle, since these laws are being used again to discount the 
possibility of divine action (fine tuning) by the invocation of many 
universes. Hume’s high view of the laws of nature has effectively returned, 
again in order to make sceptical (but metaphysical) claims against theism. 
Arguably, such a move means that the old juridical/theological metaphor 
behind the term “law of nature” is making a comeback, but now in the 
opposite direction of the old metaphor, since it works against the existence 
of a divine lawgiver. 
In light of this discussion, it would seem that the term “law of nature” is 
fraught with ambiguities, and that it might be time to search for an 
altogether-different terminology to describe the objectives of science. That 
may be the case, and Nancy Cartwright for one has argued (without 
reference to the theological difficulties) that we might be better off speaking 
of the “capacities” of nature rather than its laws (Cartwright 1999, 77). 
However, I would like to make a virtue of the old metaphor, in all its 
juridical and theological glory, at least when we speak of miracle. 
Furthermore, I would also like to retain something of Hume’s robust 
scepticism. To see this, it is necessary to examine some ancient Jewish 
texts. 
The phrase “law of nature” does not appear in the Bible as such, 
although there are related discussions of the scope and character of the 
natural world, sometimes linked with torah, divine law (Harris 2013, 83-6). 
Psalm 19, for instance, begins, “The heavens are telling the glory of God”, 
moves on to describe the rising of the sun, and concludes with the 
resounding statement, “The law of the LORD is perfect, reviving the soul; 
the decrees of the LORD are sure, making wise the simple” (v.7, NRSV). 
This passage raises an interesting theological question: does the constancy 
of the sunrise testify to God’s law, or vice versa? Given that torah is 
understood as the entire framework of Israelite law––contained within, and 
embodied by the five books of Moses, and regulating concrete human 
affairs as much as the natural world––a case could be made for either view. 
At the very least we have here a theological view of that most celebrated of 
all laws of nature, the rising of the sun. (Other examples may be compared: 
Job 28:26; Pss.33:4-9; 78:23; 107:25).  
We might press these texts further to ask about a biblical view of 
miracle. This issue is complex, since, just as there is no phrase “law of 
nature”, so there is no word for “miracle” in biblical Hebrew or Greek 
either. We do, on the other hand, find terms like “sign” (e.g. Ex.4:17), or 
“great work” (2 Kings 8:4). A connection can be made between such signs, 
creation, and God’s law, as may be seen in a particularly revealing passage 
from the Wisdom of Solomon. Here, we find the Red Sea crossing 
described as an “incredible journey” (19:5), and a “marvellous wonder” 
(19:8). Significantly, we are told that the whole world needed to be re-
fashioned according to God’s command, in order for the miracle to happen: 
 
For the whole creation in its own kind was again formed anew, complying 
with your commands, so that your children might be kept unharmed 
(Wisdom 19:6). 
 
Here, there is no sense that the Deity intervenes in the natural order, nor that 
the Deity transgresses a law of nature in order to part the sea; rather, God is 
said to completely re-forge creation, effectively giving new laws 
(“commands”) to the entire natural world. In this way, the miracle of the 
Sea becomes a stunning example of a “new creation” through a 
considerably more positive understanding of miracle than Hume’s, although 
it also invokes natural law.  
Accordingly, the rabbis in the first few centuries CE went even further 
with this kind of thinking, declaring that the miracles of the exodus were 
pre-ordained at the original creation, laws of nature that only become 
apparent later on. So the miracles of the manna, and of Moses’ wonder-
working staff were defined by the rabbis of the Mishnah to be part of the 
initial six days of creation described in Genesis 1 (mAboth 5:6). And as for 
the Red Sea crossing, it was taught that when God originally made the sea 
back in Genesis 1, God made it a condition upon the sea that it should part 
for Moses many years later (Ginzberg 2003, 553-555). Realising that such a 
law of creation must be truly universal, the rabbis explained that all bodies 
of water in heaven and on earth parted when Moses parted the Red Sea: 
whether the water was in caves, jugs, bowls or cups across the world, it all 
parted at the same time, emphasising that the miracle took place by means 
of a universal command to creation, a law of nature. Such was the 
enthusiasm of the rabbis for the universal consequences of this particular 
miracle, that they extended the story even further, to heighten the sense of 
the miraculous. For instance, they calculated that the walls of water through 
which the Israelites walked were 1600 miles high, so that they could be seen 
by all of the nations on earth. One charming interpretation explained that, if 
an Israelite child was disturbed and cried during the passage through the 
water, its mother only had to reach out her hand into the nearby wall of 
water to pluck out an apple or some other piece of fruit to pacify the child 
(Ginzberg, 2003, 555-557)! 
Of course, such readings are likely to sound absurdly fanciful to our 
modern Western ears. However, it is important to bear in mind here the 
Jewish tradition of interpretation known as midrash, which would often 
explore the significance and the difficulties of a given story by re-telling it 
imaginatively. (The modern technique of narrative theology is not so very 
different). And in these ancient Jewish readings of the story of the Sea 
crossing we find that there is an expansive (rather than a restrictive) 
understanding of the laws of nature, which allows for miracle to be defined 
as a natural affirmation of the theology of creation, rather than (as in Hume) 
a theological violation, intervention or incursion into nature. This is so 
because the rabbis operate within a related, but theologically more inclusive 
framework than Hume. Both operate with a high view of law. But while 
Hume, the great empiricist, defines the laws of nature in terms of his 
experience and the naturalistic evidence available to him, the rabbis define 
the laws of nature in terms of the theological evidence of torah, divine law. 
For Hume the laws of nature are to be understood as legal terms only 
metaphorically; for the rabbis, the laws of nature are to be understood as 
literal components of the divine law, and components which they, the rabbis 
adjudicate over.  
For, lest it be thought that the rabbis lived in a kind of theological dream 
world compared with Hume’s naturalistic scepticism, we should note that 
the rabbis were also capable of hard-headed scepticism. (It is suggested that 
this scepticism was in part a reaction to the Christian claims made about 
Jesus as a miracle worker; Corner 2005, 165-9). There can be no better 
illustration of rabbinic scepticism towards miracles than the classic 
Talmudic account of a legal dispute found in Baba Mezi‘a 59b. Here, Rabbi 
Eliezer is so certain of his interpretation of the halakhah that he calls upon a 
nearby tree to prove him right against the other scholars gathered in 
opposition to him. The tree uproots itself and moves a hundred cubits, but 
his opponents are unimpressed. Rabbi Eliezer then calls upon a nearby 
stream to prove him right. The stream flows backwards, but again his 
opponents are unimpressed: “Water cannot prove anything,” they say. Then 
Rabbi Eliezer calls upon the walls of the building to prove him right. Sure 
enough, the walls bend inwards, but they do not fall down completely, out 
of deference to one of the other scholars present, who has rebuked the walls. 
Finally Rabbi Eliezer calls upon heaven to prove him right, and a heavenly 
voice booms out, “What have you got against Rabbi Eliezer, seeing that the 
halakhah agrees with him?” The opponents answer with amazing 
scepticism: “Torah was given to us from Sinai,” they say, “so we pay no 
attention to a heavenly voice.”  
Again, this might appear to be an outlandish and fanciful story to 
modern Western ears, but it makes the highly relevant point for our 
purposes that divine jurisdiction on both law and miracle has been handed 
over to the earthly community. God may question, but only the earthly 
community may answer authoritatively. Now that torah has been entrusted 
to human hands, it is the earthly community that interprets and adjudicates, 
whether the matter concerns human, natural, or divine interests. Hence, 
even in the face of putative signs from heaven (miracles), there can be 
grounds for scepticism while the matter is still under discussion by the 
community. The power for any decision about the law––God’s law or a law 
of nature––rests with the community, and not with a sign from heaven, 
since all is torah, and all is in the community’s hands.  
This, I suggest, is the ideal way to adopt Hume’s powerful but nihilistic 
scepticism. Hume’s “firm and unalterable experience” against miracles is 
vulnerable to the fact that it is his own individual view, informed neither by 
centuries of matured discussion of the scientific and philosophical bases of 
the laws of nature, nor by exposure to the community’s scrutiny. In 
connection, Polanyi explains that modern science as we know it is a 
communal activity: individual geniuses can make a difference, but 
ultimately it is the consensus of the scientific community that adjudicates 
(judges) over acceptable scientific ideas and results, and indeed even over 
what constitutes “science” (Polanyi 1958, 1962, 163-4, 216-7). From that 
point of view, the fabled objectivity that postmodernity insists is out of 
reach is very much within reach when it is the scientific community’s 
current consensus. Applying these ideas––mediated by Polanyi’s juridical 
understanding of the scientific community, but clearly operative in rabbinic 
discussion of miracles too––I would like to commend a community-based 
approach to miracles. This would be aided on the one hand by the rabbinic 
high theological view: the laws of nature are God’s laws commanded to 
nature within an inclusive theology of creation. But on the other hand, such 
a high theological view must be constantly subjected to a community-based 
scepticism. The power of miracle, I suggest, actually lies with the human 
communities of faith, and how they adjudicate divine law and natural law.  
To summarise, I have explored Hume’s definition of miracle, and have 
pointed out some of the inconsistencies. Like many interpreters before me, I 
have suggested that Hume’s definition is vulnerable on account of his very 
“high” view of the laws of nature, a view which is difficult to sustain in 
light of contemporary philosophies of science. One of the most significant 
problems arises from the fact that Hume’s definition works by reviving the 
old juridical/theological metaphor underlying the term “law of nature”. By 
way of contrast with Hume, I have introduced early Jewish views which 
understand the laws of nature as literal expressions of divine torah. These 
views are able to incorporate miracle naturally within a universal and 
adaptive theology of creation. Canonical miracles of torah are 
enthusiastically affirmed in such a view, but all miracles are nevertheless 
subject to stringent deliberation (and if necessary, scepticism), by those in 
the community who have been accredited to judge over human and divine 
law. We find then that through the community of experts both “laws of 
nature” and miracles become juridical matters. Ready parallels may be 
drawn with Polanyi’s idea of the modern scientific enterprise as a 
community exercising a juridical capacity over the results and scope of 
science: the “laws of nature”. This comparison between the rabbinic 
community and the scientific community illustrates again that Hume’s 
definition of miracle is inadequate to account for the complex and dynamic 
ways in which both miracle and laws of nature emerge. No easy definition 
of either is sufficient; rather, working understandings of both miracle and 
natural law materialise through robust scrutiny and even scepticism by the 
respective juridical communities. 
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